Who Is to Blame for Youth Religiousness in Postwar Ukraine?

1946—a short time before the thirtieth anniversary of Soviet rule over the former Russian Empire. A whole generation of Soviet citizens had been born and raised under a government that proclaimed religion as the "opium of the people" and its eradication as the duty of every communist. Their offspring—pioneers and Komsomol members—grew up with the understanding that God does not exist. But did they really absorb this lesson as unanimously as expected? And in the "correct" way?

Reports from Soviet officials monitoring religious activity in Ukraine reveal growing concern. More than that, a new required section—"The Church and Youth"—has been added to every regional representative's report to the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Little Room for Optimism

The Council’s representative for the Ukrainian SSR, Pavel Khodchenko, compiled the reports and presented them to Georgy Karpov, chairman of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the USSR Council of Ministers. Among the bureaucratic voices, a few—such as the representative from Voroshilovgrad (now Luhansk) Oblast—reported a decline in youth religiosity: "Church influence on youth in the region is weak, limited to isolated individuals who have undergone personal hardships. Overall, young people do not attend church."

Similarly, the Mykolaiv representative observed, "Attendance at rural churches and prayer houses is significantly lower than in 1944–45. On Sundays, no more than 10–15 elderly women and men attend; youth presence is minimal."

However, the most optimistic reports tended to be the least substantiated. For instance, the Vinnytsia representative claimed that the Church had no influence on schools, yet noted that children—especially girls—frequently attended church. This contradiction suggested that while schools remained secular, individual students were still drawn to religious life.

«Church Weddings Remain the Norm...»

Most reports, however, indicated an undeniable rise in interest in church life during the first postwar year. Regional representatives in Chernihiv and Kherson stated:

• "Church life in Kyiv region continues to grow."

• "The religious movement has engaged broad masses of the population, and the war, which brought immense suffering, has provided fertile ground for religious sentiment."

• "Certain parishes show increasing activity and influence. The number of parishioners is growing, including young people—especially girls—and children attending church services."

Particularly alarming to officials was the appeal of monastic life. The Kamianets-Podilskyi representative reported, "Among young people, there is a significant attraction to monasticism."

The situation was especially pronounced in territories annexed by the USSR in 1939, where anti-religious propaganda had not yet fully taken root. The Ternopil representative noted, "Most of the population in the oblast are believers, and thus the Church influences the youth. Before the liberation of Western Ukraine from German occupation, they lived in a state of 'religious intoxication,' and, with few exceptions, have not broken free from church influence. Young people, following their parents' example, still see it as their duty to attend church services, especially on holidays. Church weddings remain the norm."

The Volyn representative provided striking figures:

• "Nearly 100 young people applied to the fall 1945 pastoral-theological courses."

• "The oblast has about 200 church choirs, involving 4,000–5,000 singers—70–75% of them young people, mainly girls aged 18–22."

• "In Lutsk, at least 30% of churchgoers are young people, and 10% are school-aged children."

Despite some regional variations, reports overwhelmingly confirmed that youth religiosity in postwar Ukraine was not declining. On the contrary, activity among believers had increased.

This trend posed a challenge for Soviet authorities. The government sought closer relations with the Moscow Patriarchate, yet it also aimed to prevent the Church from expanding its influence. In Ukraine, this was particularly delicate: for many in newly annexed territories, the Russian Orthodox Church was associated with Russian national identity and Slavic unity—an ideological complication for Soviet rule.

Blaming the Weather?

Soviet officials struggled to explain the persistence of religious sentiment among Ukrainian youth. Theories ranged from the bizarre to the geopolitical. The Vinnytsia representative suggested that "believers' activity was influenced by meteorological conditions. There was a prolonged drought in our oblast, and some backward elements thought it was due to a lack of prayer."

The Odessa representative cited the legacy of occupation: "The nearly three-year occupation left its mark. The Romanian authorities forced atheists to undergo religious rites such as weddings and baptisms. Many adults were baptized during this period."

However, this theory was inconsistent—Odessa was liberated in April 1944, yet church attendance remained strong two years later.

Some officials pointed to clergy activism. For instance, in Dnipropetrovsk, a priest sought permission to include schoolboys in a church choir. In Rivne, a hieromonk organized a religious procession of 40 young women to Pochaiv Lavra.

More significantly, officials cited parental influence:

• "In some cases, grandmothers and mothers lead preschoolers to church" (Kharkiv region).

• "There are cases of parents forcing schoolchildren to attend services" (Voroshilovgrad region).

• "In Ternopil region, youth follow their parents' example and attend services, especially on holidays."

Even orphanage children visited churches voluntarily in Zaporizhzhia—officials speculated it was "out of curiosity."

Church as an Alternative to Soviet Cultural Spaces?

Officials also attributed youth church attendance to the poor quality of Soviet cultural life. The Kharkiv representative argued: "Church services have a theatrical aspect, and the real problem is weak cultural-educational work by party and Komsomol organizations, especially in rural areas. Where clubs, reading rooms, and amateur arts circles are more active, youth church attendance is lower."

Another official added: "Some youth are put off by rude behavior in clubs and red corners. Others are drawn to the beauty, order, and cleanliness of churches, as well as the quality of the singing."

Indeed, church music, liturgical art, and solemn rituals likely had a greater aesthetic appeal than Soviet propaganda posters or crude folk performances.

A Problem Without a Clear Solution

The reports left no doubt: youth religiosity in Ukraine was a serious concern for Soviet authorities. Officials proposed expanding cultural-educational efforts to counter religious influence, but evidence suggested that even communists, war heroes, and university students were turning to the Church.

One official expressed hope that rising living standards would lead to "religion's decline." Others noted that wealthier families tended to be more religious. But perhaps the real explanation lay deeper: as one Soviet official privately admitted, "Some youth go to church not from faith, but because they seek answers that Soviet education does not provide."

Would officials dare acknowledge that "the soul is by nature Christian"? Certainly not in their reports.